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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper reflects on the recent global study “Legal, 
Financial and Integrity Aspects of Club Ownership in 
Football” published in 2018 and spearheaded by the 
International Association of Lawyers (UIA), the 
International Centre for Sport Security (ICSS) 
INSIGHT, and the Sport Integrity Global Alliance 
(SIGA). 
Astonishingly, the preliminary findings of this 
study reveal that only three countries have a 
dedicated body that specifically oversees 
investments in football clubs and their ownership, 
and only two are able to fully track and monitor the 
money behind such investments and ownership. 
In line with the study above, a growing body of 
recent literature has been devoted to the 
complexities and dark sides of the management of 
football teams consider, for instance: Chadwick et 
al., 2018; Sudgen et al., 2017; Holzen et al., 2019; 
Kelly et al., 2018; May et al., 2019; Porter et al., 2019. 
Some of those authors focus on football 
scandals and corruption, others on mismanagement 
by agents, others on whistleblowing as a new 
regulatory instrument in global governance. 
As such, the vast majority of countries do not 
have any mechanisms in place to understand the 
sources of investments in a club and rely on generic 
laws „assuming‟ that any financial scrutiny falls 
under the country‟s existing club licensing system. 
Given these premises, the paper analyzes the 
case of Italy‟s Serie A, developing some 
considerations on the negative consequences of the 
lack of transparency (e.g., purchasing clubs for non-
sporting reasons, such as transforming them into 
money laundering vehicles, third-party investment 
funds, and sports betting fraud). 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
reviews the recent literature, Sections 3 and 4 focus 
respectively on the current status quo of football in 
general and in Italy in particular, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Generally speaking, football teams are either 
controlled by a broad base of investors and 
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supporters or fall under the control of a small 
number of shareholders, namely, a family. 
The relationship between the football industry 
and ownership has garnered interest in recent years 
in different institutional and cultural domains. 
Consider, for instance, the seminal paper of 
Adams et al. (2017) who apply “boundary theory” to 
football organizations, stating this theory “was 
developed to make sense of complex social 
interactions [...] to understand how a football club 
negotiates its relationships and organizational form 
within the network of social groups or worlds upon 
which its existence depends and with which it shares 
boundaries [...]”. 
The authors argue that “turbulence in the 
political, social, and financial infrastructures of 
professional football has contributed to evolution in 
football clubs‟ ownership and governance structures. 
The use of boundary theory has allowed us to 
demonstrate how the boundaries of organizations 
involved in the production and delivery of football 
have become increasingly blurred, evident both in 
changes in the identities of clubs‟ social groups, in 
particular supporters and owners, and in the 
emergence of new organizational forms. The 
blurring of a football club‟s boundaries is linked to 
the extent and nature of the interfaces present in the 
configuration of social worlds and social 
infrastructure of that club”. 
In fact, “even though professional football in 
the postmodern era is turning an increased focus 
towards the shareholder perspective, it is utterly 
important to maintain a strong focus on 
stakeholders, where supporters and the local 
community may be the most important ones to 
maintain the viability of a football club” (Junghagen, 
2016). 
At the same time, Cocieru et al. (2019) point 
out the psychological side of ownership, stating “a 
major development in international sport 
governance is the increasing number of clubs owned 
by supporters. Researchers have advocated for more 
supporter involvement in the governance of sport 
teams but have not fully explained why some 
supporters attempt to become team owners. Sport 
governance scholars have also generally ignored the 
perspectives of those fans that do not seek to 
become club owners”. Taking the perspective of 
psychological ownership theory and using semi-
structured interviews to examine the perspectives of 
a professional football team‟s supporters, they find 
that “a primary reason supporters attempt to 
become club owners lies in their sense of 
psychological ownership for their team. Following 
this sense of ownership, supporter ownership 
initiatives appear to follow a certain pattern of 
events, including a sense of dissatisfaction, 
expressing such dissatisfaction in an attempt to 
bring about change, and eventually, initiating a 
formal ownership movement after reaching a tipping 
point”. Last, they argue that “during supporter 
ownership movements, the actions taken by 
supporters involved in such initiatives may impact 
fans not involved in the ownership movement” 
(Cocieru et al., 2019). 
The relationship between ownership and 
financial results has given rise to mixed and 
ambiguous findings. For instance, according to 
Sanchez et al. (2017), “football teams organized as 
members clubs, with dispersed ownership and 
uncontrolled by foreign investors perform better. 
Thus, property structures facilitating less control 
over managers relate positively to performance”. 
Based on the suggestion that “professional 
European football clubs have been hypothesized to 
maximize sporting or financial objectives”, Rohde 
and Breuer (2018) analyze the impact of various 
ownership structures on management efficiency in 
maximizing profitability and national sporting 
success.  
Referring to a panel of English and French 
clubs between 2006 and 2012, Rohde and Breuer 
(2018) find that clubs that are “majority-owned by 
private investors are less efficient than other clubs 
in French Ligue 1. In English professional football, 
the majority of takeovers is pursued by foreign 
investors”, concluding that “although previous 
researchers have shown that foreign investors 
increase financial resources and team investments 
[...] the analysis of survival and financial team 
efficiencies of club ownership structures indicates 
that clubs tend to compete by investments rather 
than efficiency”. 
Acero et al. (2017) argue poor governance and 
lack of transparency, finding “an inverted U-shaped 
curve relationship between ownership structure and 
financial performance as a consequence of both 
monitoring and expropriation effects”. 
However, the current paper focuses mainly on 
the work of Andrews and Harrington (2016) 
described in the next section. 
 
3. TRACKING THE STATUS QUO 
 
According to Transparency International1, “the risk 
of corruption at too many football associations 
around the world is high. This problem is made 
worse by the lack of information such as audited 
financial statements by many associations”. 
In their pivotal study “Off pitch: Football’s 
financial integrity weaknesses, and how to strengthen 
them”, Andrews and Harrington (2016) point out 
that “in terms of financial transparency, we asked 
even more basic questions; focused on whether 
organizations involved in football produce financial 
reports according to standards, make reports and 
information available to key stakeholders (like 
boards and tax bureaus), and make reports and 
information available to broader groups of 
interested stakeholders (like supporters)”. 
Amongst other interesting points, these 
authors depict two main tiers in the football 
industry: the top tier, and the tier of clubs below 
them, where “national associations and league 
bodies have limited capacity to provide the oversight 
needed for many clubs (we assume that limited 
oversight probably yields limited compliance)” 
(Andrews & Harrington, 2016). 
Furthermore, they refer to the abundant 
literature and examples of weaknesses in club 
transparency, accounting, and reporting regimes. 
For instance, Emery and Weed (2006) describe a 
limited financial management capacity in lower 
league clubs in England, and David Prochazka‟s 
(2012) study reveals that a significant number of 
Czech football clubs submit their financial 
statements to the Business Register late or do not 
submit them at all. In another example, Barajas 
                                                          
1 https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/nov/19/transparency-
international-fifa-secretive 
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(2004) finds “a lack of financial transparency” in 
Spanish football (Andrews & Harrington, 2016). 
The depiction of clubs according to their 
natural position in the tiers (in the top or below) is 
pervasive, sustained, and agreed: at the same time, 
the authors are well aware that even in the top tier, 
more articulated schemes can lead to financial 
misperceptions and failures. 
In this sense, they present the case of the over-
articulated relationship between Paris St Germain 
and UEFA. See the figure below, taken directly from 
Andrews and Harrington (2016). 
 
Figure 1. Paris St Germain and UEFA: linkages between UEFA, brotcasting contacts and Paris St Germain 
 
 
 
Source: Authors analysis, based on published information about relationships between entities. 
 
This figure does not argue that there are de 
facto wrongdoings in the financial dealings or 
relationships shown but highlights the important 
and widespread presence of potential and apparent 
conflicts of interest for UEFA that are not properly 
disclosed.  
In other words, the issue of potential conflicts 
of interest and black boxes concerns both minor and 
major clubs due to their implicit organizational and 
normative apparatus and their close link with 
supervisory bodies. 
More recently, in November 2018, the 
preliminary findings from an independent global 
study were released. Titled “Legal, Financial and 
Integrity Aspects of Club Ownership in Football”, this 
is the first phase of a global study jointly 
undertaken by UIA in partnership with ICSS INSIGHT 
and SIGA. In detail, a team of lawyers from 25 
countries, including top football nations, provided a 
robust and independent diagnosis of the legal 
landscape relating to football club ownership in 
their respective jurisdictions. 
The project‟s overall conclusion is a general 
lack of effective supervision and due diligence and 
weak regulatory frameworks on club ownership and 
investments. 
Surprisingly, the preliminary findings reveal 
that only three countries have a dedicated body that 
specifically oversees investments and ownership in 
their football clubs, and only two nations are able to 
fully track and monitor the money behind such 
investments and ownership. Instead, the vast 
majority of countries do not have any mechanisms 
in place that enable understanding the source of a 
club‟s investments, relying on generic laws, and 
most „assuming‟ that any financial scrutiny falls 
under the country‟s existing club licensing system. 
The preliminary results show a considerable 
lack of transparency across all levels of clubs, with 
details of exact ownership and investments virtually 
invisible at the lower league and club levels. Some of 
the preliminary findings include: 
– While 83% of countries have an obligation 
under national legislation to disclose club 
owners/investors‟ identities, only the UK, 
Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland have some kind 
of a structure/process with a monitoring and control 
role. 
– Public information regarding full ownership 
and investment structures is only available in 
Belgium, Ukraine, and the UK. 
– Only five countries (Brazil, UK, France, 
Portugal, and Ukraine) have the legal obligation to 
fully disclose club owners/investors in both 
professional and non-professional football clubs. 
– 64% of countries require information on club 
ownership structure for only the professional top 
two level divisions. 
– Where countries have disclosure obligations 
that apply to full ownership structure, the majority 
is unable to identify the ultimate beneficial owner of 
the club; only 39% of countries monitoring club 
ownership are able to track the ultimate beneficial 
owner, albeit with limitations.  
– Only three countries (France, Italy, and 
Switzerland) have a dedicated registry body that 
deals with club ownership. 
Amongst those interviewed after the 
publication of these astonishing results were:  
 Fernando Veiga Gomes, President of the 
Sports Law Commission of the UIA – International 
Association of Lawyers, who stated: “What most 
impressed me with the preliminary findings of the 
Global Study on Club Ownership is the lack of 
adequate and strong regulation regarding club 
ownership. I was also surprised by the lack of pre-
acquisition clearance in most countries and with the 
fact that 70% of the countries analyzed have no fit 
and proper test regarding their board members. We 
have moved from TPO to club ownership and in fact, 
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the same problems such as influence, conflicts of 
interests, and lack of integrity are still out there”. 
 Rick McDonell, former Executive Secretary of 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Executive 
Director, ACAMS and Vice Chair of the SIGA 
Standing Committee on Financial Integrity, who 
stated: “This study confirms what I suspected since 
my days at the Financial Action Task Force when we 
commissioned the first report that researched 
money laundering in the world of football: lack of 
transparency allows corruption to thrive and no 
industry is immune. The preliminary findings show 
a need for a robust regulatory approach, with the 
effective fit and proper owners‟ tests in every 
country to close the loopholes that enable third-
party investment funds to conceal the identities of 
the ultimate beneficial owners. There is a need for 
sports organizations to implement the SIGA 
Universal Standards on Financial Integrity, which 
offer an antidote to this problem”. 
 Pedro Machado, Head of Legal Department, 
Bank of Portugal and Vice Chair of the SIGA 
Standing Committee on Financial Integrity, who 
stated: “Whilst I am not surprised by the preliminary 
findings of this groundbreaking study, I am 
concerned by the number of black holes in club 
ownership worldwide. It is clear that urgent action is 
needed to close the gaps. Without transparency, we 
cannot adequately respond to the challenges facing 
sport. As one of the Vice Chairs of the SIGA Standing 
Committee on Financial Integrity, this study goes to 
the heart of the problem: proof of origin of funds 
coupled with sound accounting and auditing 
practices. SIGA is committed to pushing for reform 
on club ownership via the implementation of the 
SIGA Universal Standards and corresponding 
Implementation Guidelines”. 
In December 2018, abundant media coverage 
was given to the German Football Federation 
President, Reinhard Grindel, who launched a 
withering attack on FIFA president Gianni Infantino 
over the lack of transparency on proposals for new 
competitions. “With this lack of transparency on 
these questions he is reinforcing the prejudices 
against FIFA”, said Grindel to journalists. “It is why I 
am insisting with my UEFA colleagues in the FIFA 
Council on the creation of a task force where all the 
information can be laid out on the table and we can 
determine with honesty if we need other 
competitions and if so what format they should 
take” he continued. 
Infantino has long envisaged the creation of an 
international nation‟s league and a Club World Cup 
expanded to 24 teams. In November, he told AFP 
that it was the best way to fight the possibility of a 
breakaway Super League.  
The vague proposal to sell FIFA rights for $25 
billion over 12 years to finance the club tournament 
also concerned Grindel, “I would be satisfied if FIFA 
launched an open process of discussion and if the 
principals concerned, that is the clubs, the leagues, 
and the federations were involved in the 
discussions”. 
Grindel‟s concerns echo those that the UEFA 
President, Aleksander Ceferin, voiced at the start of 
December, “we still have a lot of difficulties with 
these two proposals”. He was particularly 
ambivalent about the Club World Cup, which would 
be financed by a fund whose origins and names of 
supporters are unknown.  
In conclusion, the literature in recent years 
(and even the last months of 2018) has shown an 
increasing interest in relation to opaque spaces 
within the realm of football clubs and their 
complicated financing and collaboration 
architectures. Both large and small clubs and 
institutional bodies (such as UEFA) are under 
increasing scrutiny from scholars and the media. 
 
4. THE CASE OF SERIE A 
 
In light of the aforementioned, and based on the 
available documentary evidence (from the register of 
Italian Chambers of Commerce and a miscellanea of 
information on the web), this section depicts the 
ownership structure of the 20 Italian football clubs 
currently (as of the 2018/2019 season) belonging to 
the highest category, Serie A. 
 
Table 1. Italian clubs and details (Part 1) 
 
Title of the club Details 
Juventus,  
Lazio, Roma 
These three clubs are listed on the Stock Exchange. Nevertheless, the beneficial and ultimate owner is 
always clear, namely, the Agnelli family, Claudio Lotito, and James Pallotta respectively. 
Atalanta In Bergamo, Antonio Percassi, a former defender in the 1970s, holds 80% in Atalanta (the rest divided 
between 150 partners) via the holding company Odissea together with the cosmetics chain Kiko. 
Bologna A North American group headed by Joe Tacopina and Joey Saputo stated its interest in acquiring the club in 
2013. On 15 October 2014, the board of directors ratified the sale of the club to BFC 1909 Lux SPV, which is 
owned by the BFC 1909 USA Spv LLC, an American company in which Saputo has interests.  
Cagliari Since 2014, the club has been owned by Fluorsid, a company that produces fluorochemicals since 1969 and 
which in turn is owned by the Giulini family, close to the former patron of Inter, Massimo Moratti. 
Chievo According to the media, the club is generally deemed to be in the hands of Luca Campedelli, owner of the 
renowned Italian pastry brand “Paluani”, however, Campedelli‟s sister and mother are relevant Chievo 
shareholders. 
Empoli The Italian Corsi family, operating in the textile manufacturing industry and focusing on clothing and 
leather accessories, is the owner of Empoli. 
Fiorentina The shoe and leather entrepreneur Diego Della Valle has owned Fiorentina since 2002. 
Frosinone  The controlling owner is Maurizio Stirpe, via Prima Spa, a company that operates in accessories mainly for 
cars.  
Genoa Enrico Preziosi, chairman of the board of directors of Giochi Preziosi, a toy wholesaler, is the owner of 
Genoa. 
Inter On 6 June 2016, Suning Holdings, via Great Horizon Sarl, signed a contract to acquire a majority stake 
(around 70%) from Erick Thohir‟s consortium (International Sports Capital) and the Massimo Moratti family 
(Internazionale Holding). The deal was approved by the extraordinary general meeting on 28 June, after 
which Suning Holdings acquired 68.55% shares.  
Milan In July 2018, Elliott Advisors Limited took control of the club after the previous owners defaulted on the 
repayment. In its first move as the new owner, Elliott allocated Milan €50 million in "equity capital" to 
provide financial security in the short term. 
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Table 1. Italian clubs and details (Part 2) 
 
Title of the club Details 
Napoli The club is owned by Aurelio De Laurentiis, a film producer. 
Parma After a brief period under the control of Jiang Lizhang, a Chinese businessman, the club was re-founded by 
a group of Parma-based entrepreneurs (Guido Barilla, Giampaolo Dallara, Mauro Del Rio, Marco Ferrari, 
Angelo Gandolfi, Giacomo Malmesi, and Paolo Pizzarotti). 
Sampdoria The club is owned by Vanessa Ferrero, daughter of the patron Massimo Ferrero, an entrepreneur. 
Sassuolo The Squinzi family, via the family firm Mapei (a worldwide producer of adhesives, thinsets, and sealants for 
buildings), controls the club. 
Spal Spal is owned by the Colombarini family, which in turn owns Vetroresina Spa, a company that produces 
polyester resin laminates. 
Torino  The beneficial and ultimate owner since 2005 is Urbano Cairo whose principal business interests are in 
Cairo Communication, a business he founded. Urbano Cairo, via U.T. Communications and UT Belgium 
Holding, owns a 50.1% stake in Cairo Communication. U.T. Communications is also the parent company of 
Torino F.C.  
Udinese Giampaolo Pozzo, once owner and director of Freud, a leading manufacturer of industrial woodworking 
tools, is the owner of Udinese. 
 
Even if in some cases the ownership of Italian 
football clubs came about via a number of different 
stages and with some foreign countries (consider, 
for instance, Bologna), clear ownership, an Italian 
family or a family with Italian entrepreneurial 
ancestors, is present in 18 out of 20 cases. In fact: 
1) the three listed companies pertain to three 
families (Agnelli, Lotito, Pallotta); 2)  all the other 
clubs (with the exception of Inter and Milan) are 
owned by an entrepreneurial family: Percassi, 
Saputo, Giulini, Campedelli, Corsi, Della Valle, Stirpe, 
Preziosi, De Laurentiis, Parmesan entrepreneurs, 
Ferrero, Squinzi, Colombarini, Cairo, Pozzo. 
In the case of Inter and Milan, even if 
traditionally linked to two well-known 
entrepreneurial families (Moratti and Berlusconi), 
foreign investors control these clubs. 
In line with the above, Regoliosi (2016) in his 
essay claims that “the relative weight of the 
ownership composition in such an analysis has not 
been ignored. Nonetheless, no test on this topic has 
been run because all Italian professional clubs are 
narrowly owned by a single owner or a family. 
Despite the fact some of them are listed on the 
Italian Stock Exchange, their floating minorities are 
very poor and mainly inactive. So, in the Italian 
football context, the characteristics of the ownership 
are not a concern”. 
However, the concentration of power in a 
limited number of entrepreneurial families gives rise 
to questions beyond clear ownership. 
First, generally speaking, the Serie A league has 
been characterized in recent decades by clubs whose 
ownership is highly concentrated in holding groups 
or individuals: since football is widely reported to be 
financially deleterious or not profitable, in Italy it 
has been used as a propaganda tool by large families 
with power and part of the Italian economic and 
political establishment (Rey & Santelli, 2017). 
Second, other authors (Boeri & Severgnini, 
2014) recall that most of the Serie A teams are run 
by individual entrepreneurs with other economic 
interests and with some direct or indirect media 
influence; most of the owners are active in 
oligopolistic sectors (such as TV, transportation, 
telecommunication, oil refinery).  
According to Boeri and Severgnini (2014) this 
situation suggests two things: first, the club is not 
seen as an independent unit whose financial 
sustainability should be pursued; second, the 
objective function is almost uniquely related to 
maximizing image returns. 
The case of Italy is useful to bring attention to 
the work of Andrews and Harrington (2016), who 
also mention an Italian club when depicting the 
“dark spaces” and black boxes between football 
clubs and organizations; see the figure below, 
directly extracted from Andrews and Harrington 
(2016). 
 
Figure 2. UEFA, Broadcasters, Italy and France: links between UEFA, broadcasters and clubs in Italy and France 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis, based on published information about relationships between entities.
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Andrew and Harrington (2016) trace a number 
of different organizational and structural 
mechanisms that could favorably enable minimizing 
the risks of potential conflicts of interest: inter alia, 
to enhance club and league transparency, increase 
commitment to financial supervision by governing 
bodies, fully disclose assets and conflicts of interest 
of football officials, build a global club registry, and 
create a transfer clearinghouse. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In recent years, the literature on football and 
accounting has focused on some opaque spaces in 
the ownership of football clubs, as well as in the 
definition of collaboration and commercial 
partnership mechanisms that, even in the case of 
larger clubs, are at times misrepresented in financial 
reports. 
The Italian case is particular in that even if 
facing clear steps of control, the strictly familial 
nature of Italian capitalism clearly emerges. 
The clubs are in fact controlled by influential 
entrepreneurial families (often operating in the 
entertainment industry) who through football 
consolidate their image. 
In other words, the risks of conflicts of interest 
and opacity in commercial formulas, already 
highlighted by the best literature, are reflected in a 
system of economic and meta/non-economic returns 
in which the object “football” becomes an 
instrument of social recognition and financial 
growth via indirect mechanisms. 
As such, these aspects need to be carefully 
monitored to enlarge the spectrum of areas of 
possible conflicts of interest between economic 
actors, and define an adequate system of checks and 
balances. 
The points above are also particularly 
significant to reduce the convenience of acquiring 
clubs for non-sporting reasons, such as their 
transformation into money laundering vehicles, 
third-party investment funds, and sports betting 
fraud. 
On the topic of money laundering, for instance, 
May (2018) developed the case of the English 
football club Birmingham City FC (BCFC). In October 
2009, the Hong Kong-based businessman Carson 
Yeung led a takeover of BCFC. The Birmingham 
International Holdings (BIH) group that he headed 
aimed to develop the club‟s business profile and 
support in China by importing Chinese players to 
BCFC and signing deals with Chinese companies. 
Yeung was arrested and charged with money 
laundering in 2011 and was unable to directly fund 
the club he bought. 
Sport and fraud have a complex and 
heterogeneous relationship. Indeed, sport and fraud, 
and more generally a crime, have the power to stir 
emotions and stimulate debate. 
In accordance with Armstrong and Hodges-
Ramon (2015), “for some, sport is a bastion of 
physical prowess and moral virtue; abiding by the 
rules and playing fair is considered a vehicle to 
encourage the wayward to veer from potential 
deviance or to rehabilitate offenders. A surfeit of 
programs designed to use sport as a method of 
crime control currently exist. However, sport itself 
contains many paradoxes and in some cases has 
become a realm for criminal behaviour: corruption, 
bribery, doping, discrimination, violence, 
hooliganism, and a host of other undesirable 
behaviors are all evidenced in the delivery and 
practice of sport. Thus, the Hydra-headed character 
of sport makes the correlate between sport and 
crime a sometimes controversial milieu”. 
In this sense, the excellent work of Caglio et al. 
(2016) concludes that “clubs wanting to participate 
to the UEFA tournaments must operate as self-
sustaining businesses protecting European football 
from bad business practices, avoiding dangerous 
injections of sometimes opaque and often volatile 
„benefactor money‟ as well as equally opaque and 
volatile instances of financial speculation such as 
third-party ownership and third-party investment”. 
Our paper sheds light on the case of Italian 
Serie A, dominated by the strong influence of family 
entrepreneurs, and its main relevance lies in 
researching such a specific field of analysis; at the 
same time, this constitutes, of course, the main 
limitation of the work, which is also a review paper. 
Enlarging the spectrum of countries and leagues 
studies, as well as using different methodologies 
(such as specific and in-depth case studies) will be 
fruitful venues of future research. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Acero, I., Serrano, R., & Panagiotis, D. (2017). Ownership structure and financial performance in European 
football. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 17(3), 511-523. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-07-2016-0146 
2. Adams, A., Morrow, S., & Thomson, I. (2017). Changing boundaries and evolving organizational forms in 
football: Novelty and variety among Scottish clubs. Journal of Sport Management, 31(2), 161-175. 
https://doi.org/10.1123/jsm.2016-0286 
3. Andrews, M., & Harington, P. (2016). Off pitch: Football’s financial integrity weaknesses, and how to strengthen 
them (CID Working Paper No. RWP16-009). Retrieved from https://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/publications/pitch-
football%E2%80%99s-financial-integrity-weaknesses-and-how-strengthen-them 
4. Armstrong, G., & Hodges-Ramon, L. (2015). Sport and crime. Oxford Handbooks Online. http://doi.org/10.1093/ 
oxfordhb/9780199935383.013.87 
5. Barajas, A. (2004). Modelo de valoración de clubes de fútbol basado en los factores clave de su negocio (MPRA 
Paper 13158). University Library of Munich, Germany. Retrieved from https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/13158/1/MPRA_paper_13158.pdf 
6. Boeri, T., & Severgnini, B. (2014). The decline of professional football in Italy. In J. Goddard, & P. Sloane (Eds.), 
Handbook on the Economics of Professional Football (pp. 322–335). http://doi.org/10.4337/ 
9781781003176.00027 
7. Caglio, A., D‟Andrea, A., Masciandaro, D., & Ottaviano, G. (2016). Does fair play matter? UEFA regulation and 
financial sustainability in European Football Industry (BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper Series No. 2016-
38). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2853349 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 16, Issue 3, Spring 2019 
 
35 
8. Chadwick, S., Parnell, D., Widdop, P., & Anagnostopoulos, C., (2018). Routledge Handbook of Football Business 
and Management. London, UK: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351262804 
9. Cocieru, O. C., Delia, E. B., & Katz, M. (in press). It‟s our club! From supporter psychological ownership to 
supporter formal ownership. Sport Management Review. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smr.2018.04.005 
10. Emery, R., & Weed, M. (2006). Fighting for survival? The financial management of football clubs outside the „top 
flight‟ in England. Managing Leisure, 11(1), 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1080/13639080500445659 
11. Holzen, M., & Meier, H. E. (2019). Do football consumers care about sport governance? An analysis of social 
media responses to the recent FIFA scandal. Journal of Global Sport Management, 4(1), 97-120. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/24704067.2018.1432983 
12. Junghagen, S. (2016). Tensions in stakeholder relations for a Swedish football club: A case study. Soccer and 
Society, 19(4), 612-629. https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2016.1267621 
13. Kelly, S., & Chatziefstathiou, D. (2018). Trust me I am a football agent‟. The discursive practices of the players‟ 
agents in (un)professional football. Sports in Society, 21(5), 800-814. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
17430437.2018.1400767 
14. May, A. (2018). Football and the „mysterious nature of global capital‟: A case study of Birmingham City FC and 
Birmingham International Holdings. International Review for the Sociology of Sport. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1012690218755051 
15. O‟Brien, J. (2017). C.A. Osasuna: Identity, ownership and governance in Spanish club football. In B. García, & J. 
Zheng (Eds.), Football and supporter activism in Europe. Football research in an enlarged Europe (pp. 121-139). 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48734-2_7 
16. Porter, T., & Ronit, K. (2019). Whistleblowing as a new regulatory instrument in global governance: The case of 
tax evasion. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2018.1546278 
17. Procházka, D. (2012). Financial conditions and transparency of the Czech professional football clubs. Prague 
Economic Papers, 21(4), 504-521. https://doi.org/10.18267/j.pep.437 
18. Regoliosi, C. (2016). The accounting treatments in professional football clubs in Italy from a Business Model 
perspective. Rivista Italiana di Ragioneria ed Economia Aziendale, 275-304. Retrieved from 
http://www.rirea.it/rirea/sites/default/files/FAR/THE%20ACCOUNTING%20TREATMENTS%20IN%20PROFESSIO
NAL%20FOOTBALL%20CLUBS%20IN%20ITALY%20FROM%20A%20BUSINESS%20MODEL 
19. Rey, A., & Santelli, F. (2017). The relationship between financial ratios and sporting performance in Italy‟s Serie 
A. International Journal of Business and Management, 12(12), 53-63. https://doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v12n12p53 
20. Rohde, M., & Breuer, C. (2018). Competing by investments or efficiency? Exploring financial and sporting 
efficiency of club ownership structure in European football. Sport Management Review, 21(5), 563-581. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smr.2018.01.001 
21. Sánchez, L., Barajas, Á., & Sánchez-Fernández, P. (2017). Does the agency theory play football? Universia 
Business Review, 53(53), 18-59. http://doi.org/10.3232/UBR.2017.V14.N1.01 
22. Souvik, N., & Hassan, D. (2018). Introduction: ethical concerns in sport governance. Sports in Society, 21(5), 721-
723. https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2018.1400783 
23. Sugden, J., & Tomlinson, A. (2017). Football, corruption and lies: Revisiting 'Badfellas', the book FIFA tried to 
ban. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315545615 
 
